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ABSTRACT 
We examined how the goal of a decision task influences the perceived positive, negative 
valence of the alternatives and thereby the likelihood and direction of framing effects. In Study 1 
we manipulated the goal to increase, decrease or maintain the commodity in question and found 
that when the goal of the task was to increase the commodity, a framing effect consistent with 
those typically observed in the literature was found. When the goal was to decrease, a framing 
effect opposite to the typical findings was observed whereas when the goal was to maintain, no 
framing effect was found. When we examined the decisions of the entire population, we did not 
observe a framing effect. In Study 2, we provided participants with a similar decision task except 
in this situation the goal was ambiguous, allowing us to observe participants’ self-imposed goals 
and how they influenced choice preferences. The findings from Study 2 demonstrated individual 
variability in imposed goal and provided a conceptual replication of Study 1. 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
According to economic accounts, such as the dominant 
discounted utility model, the way in which a problem 
is stated should not influence individuals’ preferences. 
Rather, when deciding between options, the individual 
should choose the option with the greatest overall utility, 
regardless of the way in which the problem is stated 
(or framed). These accounts (e.g., Edwards, 1954; Von 
Newmann & Morgenstern, 1953) consider the value and 
probability of the outcome, independent of the context— 
independent of the way the decision is framed. Counter to 
economic accounts, prospect theory (Kahneman &Tversky, 
1979) predicts that the way a decision problem is 
framed does influence individuals’ preferences. 
 
While this holds great importance for furthering the 
understanding of rational choice, prospect theory has 
failed to consider person and contextual factors in their 
editing or encoding rules (e.g., Lopes, 1983; McElroy & 
Seta, 2003; Rettinger & Hastie, 2003; Reyna & Braired, 
1991; Schneider, 1992). For example, according to Rettinger 
and Hastie the strategies that guide decisions are 
an interactive product of person and contextual variables. 
From this view, information contained in the decision 
problem is encoded and represented as a mental model. 
The content and mental representation that it generates, 
in turn, determines the decoding rules that lead to a decision. 
Different decoding processes are ordered along 
a continuum from most deliberate/analytic to most automatic/ 
intuitive. The encoding rules described by prospect 
theory lie in the middle of the continuum, intuitive but involving 
some analytical processing, as framing problems 
typically involve numbers. Similar research has shown 
that framing effects, like those predicted by prospect theory, 
are more likely for individuals who are induced or 
predisposed to process holistically, using contextual referencing 
(e.g., McElroy & Seta, 2003; 2004) and when 
more “gist like” memory retrieval is utilized (e.g., Reyna 
& Brainerd, 1991; Reyna, Lloyd & Brainerd, 2003). This 
work highlights the importance of considering both person 
and contextual variables in understanding how individuals 
encode (edit) information in a decision-problem. 
 
Goals. The consideration of person factors, such 
as personal goals is important for understanding the 
decision-making process (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee- 
Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Krantz & Kunreuther, 
2007; Stapel & Koomen, 2006). It may not only 
provide insight into the encoding process and the likelihood 
of framing effects, but it also may provide information 
about the direction of framing effects. Two studies 
were designed to test this possibility. In the typical 
framing problem used in the literature it is implicitly assumed 
that decision-makers view an increase in the outcome 
or commodity as desirable and positive. For example, 
in risky-choice studies utilizing the classic Asian dis- 
ease approach, decision-makers typically make a choice 
about a situation where increasing the commodity (e.g., 
human lives) is the goal. So whether the problem is 
framed positively as gains or negatively as losses, the 
goal of increasing lives remains constant and desirable to 
decision-makers. Studies, such as the Asian disease problem 
that have the inherent goal of increasing the commodity 
(lives), generally demonstrate findings consistent 
with prospect theory predictions; risk-aversion when the 
problem is framed as a gain and risk-seeking when it is 
framed as a loss. 
 
All tasks, however, are not oriented in the direction of 
increasing the commodity in question; with some tasks, 
the goal is to decrease it. One example is when individuals 
are overweight and seek to lose undesirable body fat. 
In this situation, because a gain in body weight is inconsistent 
with a decision-maker’s goal, each gained unit of 
body weight is undesirable; conversely, because a loss is 
consistent with the decision-maker’s goal, each lost unit 
is desirable. 
 
In a situation such as this, prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) would not predict individuals to 
be risk-averse when the decision problem is framed as a 
gain and risk-seeking when it is framed as a loss. Rather, 
because decreasing the commodity is desirable, a preference 
reversal would be expected; individuals should be 
risk-seeking (not risk-averse) when the problem is framed 
in terms of gains and risk-averse (not risk-seeking) when 
framed in terms of losses. One reason why preference reversals 
are rarely seen in the literature (see Levin & Chapman, 
1990 for an exception) may be because the vast majority 
of framing studies have used problems that clearly 
involve the goal of increasing the supply of the commodity. 
Nevertheless, there are many decisions in life where 
individuals have the inherent goal of decreasing a commodity’s 
supply. 
 
Individuals, however, not only have goals of increasing 
or decreasing a commodity but at times the goal also may 
be to maintain the current status of a commodity. In this 
situation, either a gain or a loss in the commodity is contrary 
to the individual’s goal. Thus, either type of change 
is undesirable, leading decision-makers to make equivalent 
responses when the problem is framed as a gain or as 
a loss. 
 
It may not always be the case, however, that the goal 
of the task is clear. For example, McCaffery and Baron 
(2004) examined how attribute framing influenced opinions 
about taxation. They found that contextual cues, 
such as the attribute frame, evoke internalized principles 
that are used for problem analysis. Further, these different 
principles could determine the goal, which has substantial 
influence on decision processing, even leading to 
directional shifts in preference. Although this research 
did not focus on risky choice, it nonetheless demonstrated 
that people can impose different goals onto a decision 
which will then affect their processing of the task. 
 
Goal ambiguity. Framing tasks, such as the Asian disease 
problem that involve the loss of human lives typically 
generate uniform goals. Because of intergroup pressures, 
most if not all Americans desire to increase and 
not decrease the life of another American (i.e., in-group 
member). Consequently, decision-makers tend to be risk-averse 
when the problem is framed as a gain and risk-seeking 
when it is framed as a loss. It is not the case, 
however, that all framing tasks produce uniform goals. 
Just as there is variability in the frame that individuals can 
impose on ambiguous situations (e.g., Elliot & Archibald, 
1989; McElroy, Seta & Warring, 2007; Wang, 2004) the 
question of whether to increase, decrease or maintain the 
commodity in question also may be ambiguous and thus 
open to interpretation. In this case, there might be considerable 
variation among decision-makers in the goals 
that they impose; some might impose a goal to increase 
the commodity (an incremental goal), others to decrease 
the commodity (a decremental goal), and still others to 
maintain it (a maintenance goal). 
 
Further, if an approximately equal number of individuals 
impose each of the three goals then it will appear 
as though the decision frame is having little or no effect 
when we consider the decisions of an entire population 
of decision-makers; the choices of individuals who impose 
a maintenance goal will not be affected by the frame 
whereas the choices of individuals who impose an incremental 
goal will be counterbalanced by those imposing a 
decremental goal. The gain condition for individuals imposing 
an incremental goal will be relatively risk-averse 
whereas those imposing a decremental goal will be relatively 
risk-seeking. Conversely, in the losses condition, 
individuals imposing an incremental goal will be relatively 
risk-seeking whereas those imposing a decremental 
goal will be relatively risk-averse. 
 
Thus, it may be the case that although the frame is 
having a significant influence on the choices of each individual, 
the framing effect for the entire population of 
decision-makers is masked by individual differences in 
goal imposition. And failures to demonstrate framing effects 
may in fact be failures to consider the goals of the 
decision-makers. When person factors, such as decision-makers’ 
goals, are not taken into consideration, it may 
appear as though the decision-frame is having very little 
or no effect on individual choice preference, when in fact 
it is having considerable influence. 
 
Overview of studies. Our experiments were designed 
to determine whether decision-makers’ goals interacted 
with the way in which the problem was framed. In the 
first experiment we made the goal of the risky-choice decision 
problem explicit by informing our participants that 
the goal was to either increase, decrease or maintain the 
commodity in question. We capitalized on an everyday 
observation in which some individuals are underweight 
and their goal is to gain weight, some are overweight 
and their goal is to lose weight, and some are “just right” 
and their goal is to maintain weight. Thus, we were able 
to use the same commodity (weight) but shift decision-makers’ 
goals. 
 
In Experiment 2 we did not manipulate the direction of 
the goal that participants imposed onto the task; rather, 
we allowed them to self-impose a goal. To accomplish 
this, we used the same commodity as in Experiment 1 but 
did not make explicit the goal of the decision problem; 
rather, we purposefully made the goal of the decision-maker 
ambiguous so that individuals would impose their 
own idiosyncratic goals on the decision problem; some 
individuals imposing an incremental goal, others a decremental 
goal and still others a maintenance goal. Framing 
effects should not be observed for those imposing a maintenance 
goal but should be observed for individuals who 
impose either an incremental or decremental goal. However, 
because we expected the pattern of these framing 
effects to be in opposite directions, if an approximately 
equal number of participants chose each goal, then we 
should not find framing effects (or find especially weak 
ones) when we examine the decisions of our entire population 
of participants. 
 
 
 
 
2 EXPERIMENT 1 
 
In this study we made explicit the goal of increasing, decreasing 
or maintaining weight. We expected a typical 
risky-choice framing effect when the goal was to gain 
weight; a reversal of the typical effect when the goal was 
to lose weight and no framing effect when the goal was 
to maintain weight. 
 
 
2.1 Method 
 
2.1.1 Participants and design 
 
Participants were 150 Appalachian State University undergraduate 
students who received class credit for their 
participation. The design of our study was a 3 Task Goal 
(increase, decrease, maintain) X 2 Frame (gain, loss) between 
factors design. 
 
Materials and Procedure. After consenting to take 
part in the study, participants were presented with our vignette. 
We created a decision scenario involving weight 
control where all three goals as well as the frame were 
reasonable. Participants were provided with a situation 
involving an athlete who had the goal of weight control. 
Each of the weight-goal conditions are presented in italicizes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imagine that you are an athlete with the goal of (decreasing, 
increasing, maintaining) your weight as much 
as possible. Because of your sport, at this juncture in 
the season, (the lower your weight the better you can 
perform, the higher your weight the better you can perform, 
your current weight is where you can perform best). 
You have to begin a specialized training program and you 
must choose between the following two programs. Assume 
that the following alternatives represent the exact 
estimates for each training program. 
 
Participants were then presented with the following alternatives 
framed as either gains or losses: 
 
If program A is adopted, 20 pounds will be gained. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability 
that 60 pounds will be gained and a two-thirds probability 
that no pounds will be gained. 
 
Or: 
 
If program A is adopted, 40 pounds will be lost. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability 
that no pounds will be lost and a two-thirds probability 
that 60 pounds will be lost. 
Afterward, all participants were asked to rate their 
opinion of the two options on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (Definitely would recommend A) to 7 (Definitely 
would recommend B). 
 
 
3 RESULTS 
 
To determine whether goals influenced participants 
choice preferences for the different frames, we performed 
an analysis of variance on the data; the goal (incremental, 
decremental, maintain) and decision frame (gain, loss) 
acted as our independent variables and preferences as 
our dependent variables. As expected, this analysis did 
not reveal a decision frame main effect, F(1, 144) = .3, 
p>.5. It did, however, reveal our predicted decision frame 
X goal interaction, F(2, 144) = 7.5, p < .01. To explore 
the interaction we performed contrasts for gain/loss framing 
within each of our three goal conditions (See Table 1). 
 
In the increasing-goal condition we found a significant 
main effect for problem framing F(1, 48) = 6.6, 
p < .01. As may be seen in Table 1, this effect is consistent 
with typical findings in risky-choice framing tasks 
with participants demonstrating a relatively stronger risk-averse 
tendency in the gains condition than in the losses 
condition. In the decreasing-goal condition we also found 
a significant framing effect F(1, 48) = 8.33, p < .01. 
However, and consistent with our predictions, the typical 
framing effect was reversed; participants demonstrated 
a relatively stronger risk-seeking tendency in the gains 
condition than in the losses condition. Finally, in the 
maintaining-goal condition, we found no effect for the 
frame F(1, 48) = .36, p > .5. This finding fits with 
our proposition that when the goal is to maintain the current 
status, both increases (gains) and decreases (losses) 
are perceived as a loss. In fact, the preferences of participants 
in this condition did not differ from those in the 
increase-loss or decrease-gain conditions F’s < 1. 
 
The results of Study 1 demonstrate that the goal of the 
decision maker has profound effects on how individuals 
respond to the framing of alternatives. These findings further 
extend our knowledge of framing effects, providing 
a fuller understanding of how goals influence the likelihood 
and direction of framing effects. 
 
 
4 EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was twofold. First, we 
sought to determine whether participants would impose 
different goals on an ambiguous decision problem. 
Specifically, would there be individual differences in the 
goal (increase, decrease, maintain) that participants set 
for the task? Second, did participants’ “imposed goal” 
influence their decision in the same way as it did in Experiment 
1? Although we expected a framing effect for 
individuals who imposed an incremental or decremental 
goal, we expected these effects to be in opposite directions. 
Further, we did not expect to observe framing effects 
for individuals who imposed a maintenance goal. 
Thus, if roughly equal numbers of individuals imposed 
each goal we should either not find a framing effect or 
find a weak one for our entire population of participants. 
 
We provided participants with a weight control situation 
similar to Study 1. Different from Study 1 however, 
we did not include an explicit “weight-control” goal for 
the hypothetical decision task. Rather, we constructed 
the task so that the goal of the actor was purposefully 
ambiguous; allowing participants to impose their own 
weight-control goal for the task. After assessing the goal 
that individuals imposed, we next observed how the self-imposed 
goal influenced the framing effect by measuring 
participants’ risky-choice preferences. 
 
 
4.1 Method 
 
4.1.1 Participants and design 
 
Two hundred twenty-eight1 undergraduates participated 
in this study. The design of our study included the between 
factors of participants’ self-imposed goal for the 
decision task (increase, decrease, maintain) and the problem 
frame (gain, loss). 
 
 
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
 
Participants were run in groups of approximately 10 individuals. 
After providing informed consent, they were 
provided with a weight management task similar to Study 
1 except the task did not contain a defined goal.2 The situation 
read as follows: 
 
Imagine that you are an athlete and you have to begin a 
specialized weight training program and you must choose 
between the following two programs. Assume that the 
following alternatives represent the exact estimates for 
each training program. 
 
Directly afterward, participants were asked to indicate 
what they believed the goal of the athlete in the task was 
(increase, decrease or maintain weight). After determining 
the goal that they had imposed onto the task, we 
then provided participants with the risk-seeking and risk-averse 
alternatives framed either positively or negatively 
(the same as in Study 1). Finally, participants were asked 
to rate their preference for the two alternatives on a 7- 
point scale ranging from 1, definitely would recommend 
A to 7, definitely would recommend B. 
 
 
4.2 Results and discussion 
 
As expected, participants imposed different goals for the 
athlete in the decision problem. To determine whether the 
imposed goal influenced participants choice preference 
for the different decision frames, we performed an analysis 
of variance on the data with imposed goal (incremental, 
decremental, maintenance) and decision frame (gain, 
loss) acting as our independent variables and risky choice 
preferences as our dependent variable. The analysis revealed 
a main effect for imposed goal F(2, 220) = 3.71, 
p < .03, as well as the expected overall interaction 
between frame and imposed goal F(2, 220) = 12.09, 
p < .0001. As may be seen in Table 2, contrasts revealed 
that when participants imposed an incremental 
goal, they demonstrated framing effects consistent with 
those typically found in risky-choice type framing tasks 
F(1, 70) = 8.3, p < .005. However, when participants 
imposed a decremental goal, the results revealed framing 
effects that were opposite to those of participants who imposed 
an incremental goal and opposite to those typically 
found in the literature F(1, 85) = 17.1, p < .00006. Finally, 
when participants imposed a maintenance goal, a 
framing effect was not obtained F(1, 65) = .84, p > .35. 
 
 
 
 
 
An additional point of interest for us was to examine 
whether a framing effect would be found across 
the imposed goal conditions. Because there was an 
approximately equal division of the goals that participants 
imposed: increase (72), decrease (87) and maintain 
(67), we did not observe a decision frame main effect, 
F(2, 220) = 1.19, p > .27. The direction of the 
framing effect obtained by those imposing an incremental 
goal was counterbalanced by the reverse direction of the 
framing effect obtained by those imposing a decremental 
goal. The results of this study are conceptually consistent 
with those obtained in Experiment 1 and demonstrate 
how goals can influence the likelihood and direction of 
framing effects. 
 
 
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In typical risky-choice decision tasks, the goal is to increase 
the commodity at stake (e.g., lives, grades, health). 
Our findings reveal that, when the goal is different, so too 
is the perception of gains and losses. In short, the goal of 
the decision task can determine whether a relative gain or 
loss is perceived as a psychological gain or loss. We propose 
that when the task goal is to increase the commodity 
at stake, gains are consistent with decision-makers goals 
and desirable whereas losses are inconsistent and undesirable. 
The opposite is true when the task goal is to decrease 
the commodity; gains are inconsistent and undesirable 
whereas losses are consistent and desirable. When 
the goal is to maintain the current status of a commodity, 
either a gain or a loss is counter to the individual’s 
goal and this makes either type of change undesirable and 
leads to equivalent responses when the problem is framed 
as a gain or as a loss. 
 
Several reasons have been offered for when and why 
framing effects are not always obtained. For example, 
research has shown that processing style (e.g., Igou & 
Bless, 2007; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Reyna & Brainerd, 
1991) elaboration (e.g., Sieck & Yates, 1997; Simon, Fagley 
& Halleran 2004) and numeric predisposition (e.g., 
Peters, Vastfjall, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, & Dickert 
2006) can all influence the strength of framing. The results 
of the current study provide an additional reason. 
When the goal of the decision-maker is not to increase or 
decrease supply of the outcome in question, then framing 
effects would not be expected from prospect theory. 
In this situation, either a gain or a loss in the supply of 
the outcome would be undesirable from the perspective 
of the decision-maker. For example, a decision-maker 
who has a personal goal of maintaining the supply of 
an outcome such as weight, may project this goal onto 
a decision problem involving a gain or loss in weight. If 
so, from the decision-makers own perspective, a gain or 
loss would be equivalently undesirable. In this case, both 
would be perceived as losses and framing effects would 
not be expected. Situations like this highlight the importance 
of decision-makers’ goals in determining the valence 
of an outcome and thereby the likelihood and direction 
of framing effects. 
 
We believe that in most situations where risk is involved 
individuals are considering taking a chance because 
they desire to increase some commodity. Although 
this goal may be common, it is not inherent in all situations. 
A variety of circumstances exist where decreasing 
or maintaining a commodity is desirable. Thus, it is important 
to consider decision-makers’ goals in predicting 
the likelihood and direction of framing. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Two participants were not included in our analysis because they 
failed to indicate a goal for the decision task. 
 
2. It is reasonable for individuals to impose different goals onto this 
task. For example, many athletes such as football players need to either 
gain w eight or loose weight for their optimal performance. Further, 
if they are already at the desirable weight, maintenance of weight is 
crucial for best performance. 
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